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Whisler v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 40 (July 28, 2005)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION – 




The defendant, Douglas Whisler, appealed his conviction for driving while under 




The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the district court 
properly instructed the jury that, to convict Whisler, they did not have to find that he 
knowingly became intoxicated, but only that he was aware of his impairment when he 
chose to drive his vehicle. The Court further determined that admission of Whisler’s 
previous DUI convictions was proper because the danger of unfair prejudice did not 
outweigh the probative value of the convictions. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Several witnesses observed Whisler clumsily entering his vehicle and then 
weaving in and out of his lane of travel while driving.  A police officer who subsequently 
responded to Whisler’s residence arrested Whisler for driving while under the influence 
of a controlled substance or chemical.  Blood tests revealed that Whisler was under the 
influence of carisoprodol and other depressants, which he had obtained in Mexico for 
pain resulting from a chronic spine condition. 
At trial, Whisler admitted to driving while impaired, but defended on the grounds that 
he was involuntary intoxicated by medication.  He testified preemptively of a previous 
conviction on a felony DUI charge.  The jury convicted Whisler of driving while under 
the influence of a controlled substance or chemical.  Whisler appealed the conviction, 
arguing: 
(1) that the district judge erred by admitting evidence of his prior conviction because 
that conviction involved voluntary impairment, while the current charge involved 
involuntary impairment; 
(2) that the district court erroneously refused his proffered jury instruction; and 
(3) that the district court misinterpreted NRS 484.379.2 
                                                 
1 By Jared R. Gibb 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. 484.379 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
It is unlawful for any person who: 
   (a) Is under the influence of a controlled substance; 
   (b) Is under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance; or 
   (c) Inhales, ingests, applies or otherwise uses any chemical, poison or organic solvent, or any compound 
or combination of any of these, to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving or exercising 
actual physical control of a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on 
premises to which the public has access. The fact that any person charged with a violation of this 
Discussion 
 
I. Admission of Prior Convictions 
 
Under Pineda v. State,3 a party can appeal the admissibility of his or her prior 
convictions even when that party was the one who sought to admit them at trial.  As a 
threshold matter, the Nevada Supreme Court expressly upheld and followed Pineda and 
allowed Whisler to appeal the issue of the admissibility of his prior convictions. 
Under NRS 48.035(1),4 relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In this case, the Court 
determined that evidence of Whisler’s prior DUI convictions was relevant to show his 
awareness of impairment, the absence of mistake concerning his level of impairment, and 
to evaluate his credibility. The district court’s instructions that the evidence be considered 
only for these reasons and not as evidence of Whisler’s guilt of the crime charged led the 
Court to decide that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
 
II. Jury Instruction 
 
Pursuant to NRS 484.379, it is unlawful for a person to operate a vehicle on a 
highway while under the influence of a controlled substance or chemical that renders the 
person incapable of safe driving.5  Whisler argued that the State must prove, as an 
element of the crime, that he “willfully” became intoxicated.  Accordingly, Whisler 
argued that the jury instruction was improper.6  The Court, however, rejected this 
contention, ruling that willful intoxication is not an element of the offense under NRS 
484.379, but that the State must only prove that the defendant willfully drove a vehicle 
while intoxicated.  Thus, the Court held the jury instruction was proper. 
Further, the Court ruled that, although carisoprodol is not considered to be a 
controlled substance in Nevada, it is a chemical, and thus operating a vehicle while under 
its affects constitutes a violation of NRS 484.379. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
subsection is or has been entitled to use that drug under the laws of this state is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this subsection. 
 
3120 Nev. Adv. Op. 24, 88 P.3d 827, 831 (2004). 
4 NEV. REV. STAT. 48.035(1) provides: “Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues or of misleading 
the jury.” 
5 NEV. REV. STAT. 484.379 (2004). 
6 The district court instructed the jury as follows: 
 
If one should become intoxicated as a result of an innocent mistake of fact, but 
after becoming impaired was still sufficiently in possession of his facilities to know what 
he was doing and to understand the character of his acts, and with such knowledge and 
understanding should voluntarily drive a motor vehicle, the involuntariness of the 




The district court did not err in admitting evidence of Whisler’s prior DUI 
convictions because the probative value of evidence was not substantially outweighed by 
the danger of prejudice to Whisler.  Further, the jury instruction at trial was appropriate 
because under NRS 484.379, the State must not prove that a person was willfully 
intoxicated, but only that the person willfully drove a vehicle while intoxicated.  
